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 Strategic competitiveness in
 the 1990s: challenges and
 opportunities for
 U.S. executives
 Michael A. Hitt, Texas A & M University
 Robert E. Hoskisson, Texas A & M University
 Jeffrey S. Harrison, Clemson University
 Executive Overview U.S. firms face a major global competitiveness challenge. Although the
 problems relate, in part, to differences in the economic structure, history and
 cultural differences between the U.S. and foreign rivals, these factors may not
 explain as much of the variance in competitiveness as they did in the past.
 Competitiveness problems are also linked to a number of strategic factors under
 the control of managers. Among them are the absorption of managerial energy
 in mergers and acquisitions, increasing levels of debt, increasing firm size,
 greater firm diversification, lack of investment in human capital and
 inappropriate corporate culture.
 In response to these problems, many firms are restructuring. When executed
 properly, restructuring can help managers regain strategic control and improve
 the competitiveness of their companies. However, restructuring efforts must be
 accompanied by a renewed emphasis on competitive strengths. improvements in
 human resource development programs, a refocus on innovation and quality,
 promotion of an entrepreneurial culture and a global, long-term strategy.
 ..................................................................... ............................................................................................................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 Article
 In 1964 Xerox introduced the first commercial fax machine but in 1989 had only
 seven percent of U.S. fax sales. Japanese firms accounted for 67 percent of the
 U.S. fax market. Raytheon marketed the first microwave oven (called
 Radarange) to restaurants in 1947 and sales boomed when it introduced the
 household version in 1967. Today, 75 percent of the microwaves sold in the U.S.
 market are made in Pacific Rim countries. During the decade of the 1980s,
 American auto manufacturers closed 13 assembly plants while Japanese firms
 built 11 new auto manufacturing plants in the United States. Leo McKernan,
 CEO of Clark Equipment stated, "In the 1980s LBOs, takeovers and global
 competition left a path of destruction out there. Now somebody is going to have
 to fix it."'
 Most executives agree that U.S. firms face a global, competitive challenge of
 immense proportions. In a recent survey of 4,000 executives, 92 percent noted that
 U.S. competitiveness was declining and 87 percent believed that the
 competitiveness problem predated the 1980s. A concurrent survey of opinion
 leaders (e.g., economists, political leaders, CEOs of large corporations) led to the
 same conclusions.2
 Competitiveness problems are not limited to trade with Japan. According to a 1987
 report by the Council on Competitiveness, the United States hats not fared well in
 comparison to Canadax, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, West Germany, or
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 Japan. Each of these countries outperformed the U.S. in gains in standard of
 living, trade, productivity, and investment since 1974.3 Another study traced the
 world market share of firms in fifteen major industries. The U.S. held over
 two-thirds of the world market in 10 of these industries in 1960, dominated 9 in
 1970, and led in only 3 industries (aerospace, paper, and computers and office
 equipment) by 1980.4
 Differences in the cost of labor and the cost of capital are usually blamed for the
 decline of U.S. competitiveness. In this article, we argue that many of the
 competitive advantages previously attributed to Japan are either not as strong as
 perceived or have faded. This article also extends previous arguments on U.S.
 competitiveness problems by examining issues of strategic competitiveness; that is,
 strategic issues affecting firms that are under managers' direct or indirect control.
 Finally, we offer recommendations for potential solutions.
 Explanations of Competitiveness Problems
 Despite general consensus that the competitiveness of U.S. firms has declined,
 there is little agreement as to the causes. The model in Exhibit 1 separates
 strategic competitiveness explanations (those areas that managers might influence)
 from explanations focusing on differences in economic structure, and historical
 and cultural differences. We briefly review economic structure, historical and
 cultural influences on competitiveness (gray arrows) and demonstrate that some of
 these forces may not be as strong as they have been in the past. Regardless of
 their strength, managers can do little to alter these forces. Therefore, we focus
 most of our attention on competitiveness factors that are directly or indirectly
 under managerial control (solid arrows).
 Economic Structure Differences
 While still high, U.S. productivity has grown at a much slower rate during the
 past 25 years than other advanced industrial countries. For example, between
 1970 and 1986, U.S. productivity rose at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent.
 This compares to Great Britain's 3.4 percent, 3.8 percent in Germany, 4.2 percent
 in France, and 6.0 percent in Japan. If we use 1950 as a base of 100, by 1988 U.S.
 productivity had grown to about 200, West Germany to 650, and Japan to 2000.5
 It has been suggested that the disparity between U.S. and foreign productivity is
 directly related to educational system differences, the cost of labor, and the cost of
 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE DIFFERENCES
 - Poor Educational Systemr
 - Hih Cost ol Labor
 - High Cost of Capital
 Low Savings Rate
 High Levels ol Foreign Investment in U.S
 STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS REGAINING STRATEGIC CONTROL
 FACTORS U.S. COMPETITIVENESS OUTCOMES FOR COMPETMVENESS
 - Increasing Mergers and Acqstshlons Hig Trade DecO ownsoping Hirgh Llnb of Deb - InduTrie Denektbpmert ol Human Capital
 - Increesintg Size - D ining Industreneswed Emphasis on R&D
 Increasing Diversicelion - Slow ProductivOy Growth _ - Eftective Corporate Culure -Low Investm orits in Human Capital -Endr prene rial Spirit
 Poor Corporate Culture Long-term and Global Focus
 + | - ~~~~~~~~~~~High Qualk Products
 HISTORICAL/CULTURAL INFLUENCES
 - Rebuilding Processes Alter World War 11
 - Homogeneous National Cultures
 (i e., Japanese)
 Decltning Resource Base Leading to
 Hostae Global Cutnpjetiion
 Exhibit 1. Causes and Competiveness Consequences
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 capital. Associated with these problems are the low savings rate and increases in
 foreign investment in the United States.
 For example, a Poor Educational System. It is estimated that approximately 20 percent of adult
 company built a new Americans are functionally illiterate and that over 25 percent of our high school
 plant with students do not graduate. The effects of this problem are dramatic. For example, a
 computer-integrated company built a new plant with computer-integrated manufacturing and statistical
 manufacturing and process controls but the emploIees could not operate the equipment because 25
 statistical process percent of them were illiterate. It has also been argued that U.S. high school
 controls but the students' math skills are lower than foreign students'. On the other hand, it is
 controls bout tne argued that the U.S. educational system promotes greater creativity. However,
 employees could not U.S. businesses have failed to capitalize on this comparative advantage.
 Operate the equipment
 because 25 percent of Managers have little direct control over the basic educational system, although
 them were illiterate. they certainly can lobby national and local governments for educational reform.
 Managers also rarely have much control over other structural issues, such as the
 cost of labor and the cost of capital.
 High Cost of Labor. The cost of labor is often described as a structural problem in
 comparison to other nations, especially those in the Pacific Rim. Although this
 may continue to be the case for developing countries such as Taiwan and Korea,
 labor costs of Japan are reaching parity with the United States. The Bureau of
 Labor Statistics recently reported that the average cost per hour of wages in 1988
 was $13.90 in the U.S. compared to $13.14 in Japan. Therefore, low wages no
 longer provide the Japanese with a distinct competitive edge. Although salaries of
 American top executives are substantially higher than their Japanese
 counterparts, compensation of middle managers in Japan are higher (median
 compensation of middle managers: Japan $85,649; U.S.-$56,505).7
 High labor costs do not automatically produce a competitive disadvantage. Some
 U.S. firms (e.g., Lincoln Electric) use reward systems characterized by generous
 employee compensation to produce high efficiency, quality, and innovation. In
 fact, the cost of labor is often less than fifteen percent of total product costs.
 High Cost of Capital/Low Savings Rate. Experts argue that U.S. firms must
 improve their capital investment, emphasizing automation (thereby reducing labor
 costs). Furthermore, this change is necessary if U.S. firms are to match foreign
 competitors' productivity growth. It is often suggested that the high cost of capital
 in the United States discourages investment in capital equipment.
 High labor costs do Recent evidence suggests that major inputs affecting the cost of capital may be
 not automatically closer between Japan and the U.S. than previously acknowledged. In a recent
 produce a competitive Wallstreet Journal article, Kenichi Ohmae argued that, due to measurement
 disad vantage. errors, previous differences in savings rate comparisons of Japanese (16.6 percent
 and Americans (4.3 percent) may not be accurate. Using Ohmae's adjustments,
 plus adjusting for comparable asset bases, the Bank of Japan estimated the U.S.
 savings rate as 14.7 percent and the Japanese as 16.7 percent. The standard U.S.
 rate has been increasing.8 This suggests that the cost of capital in both countries
 may be closer than earlier estimates showed.
 These arguments suggest that although structural differences may continue to
 explain some variance in competitiveness, they may not be as salient as they once
 were.
 Historical/Cultural Influences
 The decline of U.S. competitiveness also has been linked to historical trends in the
 global economy and to cultural differences across country borders.
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 Rebuilding Processes. Relatively low productivity gains of American firms are
 often attributed to post-World War II rebuilding processes in Germany and Japan.
 The economic infrastructure of these countries was decimated during World War
 II, but post-war rebuilding processes allowed newer and more productive plants
 and equipment to replace destroyed assets. More than four decades have now
 passed since the end of World War II. While Germany and Japan may have had a
 head start in acquiring updated plants and machinery, this advantage has
 diminished with time and probably accounts for very little new productivity
 growth.
 Homogeneous National Cultures. It is often suggested that the homogeneity and
 work ethic associated with Japanese culture have strongly contributed to the
 competitiveness of Japanese firms. However, management practices associated
 with Japanese culture are changing with continued industrial growth. The ideals
 of lifetime employment, a seniority-based wage system, and consensus decision
 making are undergoing significant changes.
 Japanese firms can no longer compete on the basis of production efficiencies
 alone. They are facing competition from other low cost producers in South Korea
 and Taiwan. This is forcing them to move into markets that are incompatible with
 traditional Japanese culture and educational systems. Although it may seem that
 the Japanese produce high technology products, their system is stressed by having
 to move from producing micro computers to making super computers. They are
 confronting similar problems in aerospace and communications where high
 creativity is required. They appear to be more effective in developing
 manufacturing processes for technology developed by others. However, Korea
 and Taiwan also have this expertise. Also, historical incentives no longer have the
 same motivational value for a new Japanese generation that is less willing to
 conform rigidly to traditional social norms. These trends are creating greater
 similarities between American and Japanese cultures.
 Organizational attributes such as structure, rules, and procedures are similar
 among organizations in different national cultures, particularly in industrialized
 nations. Over the long term, these changes are likely to lessen cultural effects on
 competitiveness. Although some behavioral differences are likely to persist
 because of culture, firm and economic characteristics are likely to converge.9
 Declining Resource Base. The belief that scarce resources are causing a decline in
 the growth rate of the global economy has created a more hostile environment.
 This is especially true for mature basic manufacturing industries such as steel, tire
 and rubber, auto, and home appliances. According to Michael Porter, "the
 environment in most of the developed world is one of relatively slow growth
 coupled with growing global competition. 10 Increasing competition, however, has
 not necessarily placed the United States at a disadvantage. Instead, an
 increasingly competitive environment may have accelerated changes that were
 occurring because of other factors.
 Strategic Competitiveness
 Although the above factors affect competitiveness, they no longer explain as much
 of the variance in competitiveness as they may have in the past. The good news
 for U.S. managers is that the remaining strategic factors, most critical to relative
 competitiveness, are under their control. Strategic competitiveness relates to
 critical strategic decisions by which managers can affect firm competitiveness.
 The most important source of the decline in strategic competitiveness is poor
 development of new product and process technologies relative to other countries.
 For instance, the U.S. remains the leader in central processing chips, but the
 Japanese have overtaken America in memory chips. While central processing
 However,
 management practices
 associated with
 Japanese culture are
 changing with
 continued industrial
 growth. The ideals of
 lifetime employment,
 a seniority-based
 wage system, and
 consensus decision
 making are
 undergoing significant
 changes.
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 chips provide the main core of the computer, memory chips represent the bulk of
 sales.
 Another indication of this problem is U.S. firms' absence in the consumer
 electronics market. In the late 1960s, there were as many as 18 American
 television sets manufacturers. Today, Zenith Electronics Corporation remains the
 only producer. Most of the top U.S. brands (e.g., RCA, G.E., Magnavox) are made
 by Japanese and European firms. Furthermore, the U.S. is expected to play little
 or no role in the development of high definition TV a technological advance
 likened in significance to the development of jet propelled airplanes.
 Multiple reasons exist for this erosion. First, U.S. industry has been slow to
 translate new technology into commercial success. Second, manufacturing is less
 emphasized in the U.S. relative to other industrialized countries. Third, fewer
 resources are being invested in research and development and technology
 transfer than by international competitors. For example, in the United States we
 spend approximately 1.8 percent of our GNP on R&D whereas West Germans
 spend 2.6 percent and the Japanese spend 2.8 percent. 1 ' Furthermore, U.S. firms
 spend half as much of their R&D budgets on process technologies compared to the
 Japanese. Japanese firms also spend twice as much on tooling and manufacturing
 equipment. This problem is exemplified in the global steel industry. While U.S.
 firms such as Inland Steel and USX have made considerable investments to
 modernize manufacturing processes, Nippon Steel Company spends about $200
 million annually on research-an amount larger than that spent on research by
 the entire U.S. steel industry.'2 It is not surprising that U.S. patent numbers are
 declining. 13
 A recent study showed that R&D intensity (company-sponsored research and
 development expenditures divided by sales) was the principal indicator of sales
 growth relative to international competitors for firms in fifteen global industries
 from 1960 to 1986. 14
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 Compounding the problem, as competitive pressures increase, U.S. firms often
 reduce R&D expenditures and focus on short-term profits. These actions suggest
 that U.S. executives are unwilling to accept the long-term risks of innovation
 because of the uncertainty of commercial success. Most R&D investment in the
 United States is concentrated in large firms. For example, more than 85 percent
 of R&D expenditures are made in firms with over 10,000 employees.'5 This makes
 the problem worse as large U.S. firms, in response to economic structure
 differences, historical trends, and hostile competition, are likely to reduce the
 resources allocated to R&D-the area that would aid recovery in the long term.
 Sources of Declining Strategic Competitiveness
 The principal reasons for U.S. managers' continued lack of commitment to
 innovation may include the absorption of managerial energy in mergers and
 acquisitions, higher levels of debt among U.S. firms, increasing size, increasing
 diversification, lack of investment in human capital, and weak or inappropriate
 corporate cultures. These problems suggest the need to restructure large
 diversified firms.
 Managerial Energy Absorption in Mergers and Acquisitions. Acquisitive growth
 was so popular during the 1980s that the period was labelled the decade of
 "merger mania". Thousands of mergers and acquisitions were completed annually
 which required significant managerial attention and energy. Significant
 preparations and negotiations often precede the completion of acquisitions.
 Executives must review data, select acquisition targets, formulate a strategy, and
 I1
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 conduct negotiations, which all require significant time. Upon completion,
 executives of both acquiring and target firms must be heavily involved in
 integrating the target firm into the acquiring firm.
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 At the same time, attention is diverted from other important issues. Managers in
 target firms continue daily operations but rarely make long-term commitments
 during the acquisition process unless they do so to avoid takeover (e.g., through
 increased debt). The merger process is often described as a period of suspended
 animation where long-term projects are neglected. As a result, acquisition
 strategies may produce short-term perspectives and risk aversion among
 managers. Managers may even use acquisitions as a substitute for innovation. A
 recent study which examined 191 major acquisitions completed between 1970
 and 1988, showed that after acquisitions the firms invested less in R&D than
 their competition. The number of new patents also declined after acquisitions,
 suggesting a lower managerial commitment to innovation.16
 When acquisitions are used for proper objectives, managed effectively (e.g.,
 careful integration of the acquired firm), and not as a means to avoid risk, firms'
 effectiveness may be enhanced. Additionally, when acquisitions are used to
 restructure the firm (e.g., to move the firm into new growth markets, enhance
 efficiency, take advantage of core competencies and thus economics of scope,
 etc.), firm effectiveness may also improve.
 Unfortunately, many of the 1970-1980 acquisitions were not for the purpose of
 restructuring. In fact, Robert Hayes, a prominent Harvard Business professor,
 suggested that many firms were only interested in acquiring and divesting
 business rather than growing them. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it and if it is broke,
 sell it" became an operating philosophy in the 1980s, according to Hayes. 17
 High Levels of Debt. Diversifying, acquisitions and leveraged buyouts have
 produced higher levels of debt. Cash flows that could be used in other ways (such
 as for R&D) must be used to service debt costs.
 The use of leverage involves tradeoffs such as increased bankruptcy risk. While
 firms may diversify to lower business risk, the use of higher levels of debt
 increases financial risk. As a consequence, other risk-reducing measures are
 taken such as reducing investments that have long-term potential payoffs but also
 entail risk.
 Innovation is risky; for example, new ventures often require approximately eight
 years before becoming profitable and adequate cash flows are usually not
 realized for four years thereafter.'8 A recent study found a negative relationship
 between the amount of long-term debt and the amount of resources invested in
 R&D. Although lead times between new products are being reduced through
 computer-automated design, riskiness of new ventures is not decreasing.
 Therefore, increased leverage may produce greater risk aversion which, in turn,
 leads to a decreased willingness to invest in innovation. 19
 The use of debt can also have positive outcomes. For example, use of debt serves
 as discipline to managers to run more efficient operations. Because of the need to
 have appropriate cash flow to repay the debt and interest charges, managers
 must eliminate wasteful spending and create greater efficiency in firm operations.
 Furthermore, Michael Jensen, a noted Harvard financial economist, argued that,
 at the very least, shifting funds from wasteful practices to banks and bond holders
 ensures that resources are shifted from low-return firms (and possibly industries) to
 more productive ones.20
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 Our argument, however, is that effective managers should not require debt for
 discipline and efficiency. They make strategic decisions to shift resources from
 poor investments to those with greater potential returns. In other words, they
 create strategic competitiveness instead of having so much debt that potential
 discretionary resources (e.g. cash flow) are shifted to others outside their firm for
 investment.
 Increasing Size. Joseph Schumpeter, an economist who focused on innovation,
 hypothesized that large firms should be more innovative than smaller firms. He
 reasoned that large firms are more likely to have the resources to sustain an
 efficient R&D program than smaller firms. Researchers should be more productive
 because of a greater number of quality colleagues with whom to interact. Larger
 numbers of researchers also allow the development of greater specialization. The
 argument follows that larger firms should be better able to exploit innovative
 ideas. They have greater manufacturing capabilities, market power, and
 resources to move innovative ideas to the market. Large firms can also assume
 more risk because they usually have more slack resources than smaller firms.
 Despite this logic, results of studies regarding the relationship between firm size
 and production of innovation are mixed. One study found that large firms spent
 almost 100 percent more on R&D per patent than smaller firms. But, small firms
 utilized more of their patents than large firms, suggesting effective exploitation of
 innovations. Another study found that maximum innovative output occurred at
 about the sixth largest firm in the petroleum and coal industries, suggesting an
 inverted U-shaped relationship between size and innovation.22 This suggests that
 organizations are flexible and responsive up to some threshold size but encounter
 inertia after that point. A final study found that large firms conduct a
 disproportionately low amount of risky research.23
 Why doesn't Schumpeter's logic hold? One explanation may be that as firms grow
 larger, more formal behavioral controls are frequently instituted to decentralize
 decision making authority. These bureaucratic controls produce more rigid and
 standardized managerial behavior which results in inertia. A recent study showed
 that larger firms had greater structural complexity and more formalization, both of
 which were negatively related to new product introductions.25
 Increasing Diversification. Not only have firms grown larger through acquisitive
 growth, but also, until the recent restructuring (downsizing) trend, many firms
 have grown more diversified. Studies on the relationship between diversification
 and innovation have produced confusing results.
 After controlling for a set of economic variables including industry and firm size,
 two recent studies found R&D expenditures to be lower in more highly diversified
 firms than less diversified firms. These researchers concluded that differences in
 R&D spending were probably a result of differences in the control systems used.25
 In dominant business firms, corporate executives usually do not have large spans
 of control; they understand the nature of the businesses under the corporate
 umbrella (because most or all are highly related to the core business). With better
 strategic understanding, corporate executives can effectively evaluate the plans
 and intended actions of division managers (strategic control).
 Unfortunately, higher levels of diversification make it increasingly difficult for
 corporate executives to use strategic controls. Their span of control is greater and,
 therefore, the volume of information received is increased and becomes
 overwhelming. As differences among divisions increases, executives often turn to
 financial controls (e.g., ROI targets) and have less ability to determine whether
 poor financial outcomes are a result of inappropriate strategy, poor
 implementation, or events beyond division manager control. Therefore, emphasis
 13
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 on financial controls creates risk aversion and a bias on the part of divisional
 managers toward short-term efficiency. This condition results in lower investment
 in R&D and other innovation activities for highly diversified firms.
 Another recent study found that emphasis on financial incentives for division
 managers was negatively related to investment in R&D. Greater levels of
 diversification and the associated control systems produced increased managerial
 risk aversion. 26 Therefore, increased diversification may reduce managerial
 commitment to innovation.
 Inadequate Investments in Human Capital. A special report in Business Week
 concluded that the long-term neglect to human capital in the U.S. was
 undermining the nation's economic future. For example, the Council on
 Competitiveness evaluated current industry training programs as inadequate and
 concluded that these inadequacies strongly contributed to low productivity growth
 in the U.S.27 It was argued that firms have invested billions of dollars in capital
 ecuipment only to learn later that there was a shortage of skilled labor to operate
 it. 8Although human resources holds great competitive potential for U.S. firms,
 short-term, risk-averse managerial behavior frequently leads to a reduction of
 investment in employees.
 As debt costs rise, other expenditures are reduced. Investments in training and
 development often are the first to be pared.
 Another recent study
 found that emphasis
 on financial
 incentives for division
 managers was
 negatively related to
 investment in R&D.
 In the early 1980s, Phillips Petroleum invested considerable resources in
 corporate training and development. However, the firm had to take on a lot of
 debt in fending off T. Boone Pickens' takeover attempt. Afterwards, despite
 earlier pronouncements regarding the importance of developing a new
 generation of managers, Phillips totally eliminated the corporate training and
 development function. This shortsightedness can be particularly severe as the
 need to implement new and more complex technologies becomes acute.
 By laying off talented workers and reducing training during downturns,
 competitive advantages are lost. Current rigid organizational structures
 (emphasizing bureaucratic controls) do not allow full use or adequate
 development of human capital. Part of the reason for inadequate development
 and use of employees may relate to the evolution of organizational culture within
 firms.
 Poor Corporate Culture. Kilman, Saxton, and Serpa refer to corporate culture as
 "the social energy that drives or fails to drive the organization.29 Most of a
 firm's activities are guided by its culture. Managerial energy absorption, firm size,
 and diversification all affect corporate culture. For example, as managers become
 more absorbed with acquisitions, they have less time to manage the behavior of
 their employees. They delegate authority but also search for better means of
 controlling behavior by using formal rules and performance controls.
 Compensation may be based, for instance, on specific identifiable objective
 outcomes. This creates a more highly structured and less flexible culture.
 Increasing size and diversification tend to reinforce these actions. As noted earlier,
 increasing size often leads to greater bureaucratic controls which produce more
 consistent behavior patterns but less creative expression. Financial controls
 implemented in highly diversified firms produce behavioral consistency and
 short-term, risk-averse behavior. Diversification also reduces cultural control (clan
 14
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 11 Jun 2020 11:37:29 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Hitt, Hoskisson, and Harrison
 control) because a multi-versus mono-cultural system evolves with increasing
 diversification. Thus, managerial energy absorption, large size and diversification
 tend to produce corporate cultures that lower managerial commitment to
 innovation.
 Need to Restructure Large Diversified Firms
 Strategic competitiveness problems are complex. Managerial energy absorption,
 high levels of debt, large size, high levels of diversification, lack of emphasis on
 human capital, and poor organizational culture are suggestive of these problems.
 They lower commitment to innovation and lead to lack of technology development
 which reduces a firm's ability to compete.
 Restructuring a corporation often improves its competitiveness by reducing size
 and diversification. It also creates an opportunity to focus on important
 implementation issues such as employee development and an effective corporate
 culture.
 Restructuring to Regain Strategic Control
 Curing U.S. firms' competitiveness problem will be no simple task. The severity
 and pervasiveness of the malaise will require nothing short of a major reversal of
 recent trends.
 Poor global performance in the 1980s has led many firms to restructure.30
 Restructuring refers to rebuilding the strength of a firm through a strategic
 reorientation that produces changes in asset structure and resource allocation
 patterns. Restructuring efforts include downsizing and/or downscoping (reducing
 diversification) and divestments and acquisitions of new businesses (if the purpose
 is to develop and increase firm health by investing resources in those new
 businesses). Size, debt and, most importantly, diversification reduction, should
 assist managers as they attempt to regain control of their organizations.
 Although restructuring is a useful step toward regaining strategic control,
 managers must ensure entrepreneurial renewal as well. In fact, another Harvard
 business professor, John Gabarro, argued that firms no longer want to employ old
 school turnaround artists who solved problems (e.g. debt-costs) only by selling off
 or closing down operations. They want a new generation manager who can cure
 sick businesses by building strength rather than bleeding them dry.3'
 Readjusting incentives to create longer managerial time horizons is one approach
 to restructuring although Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill found that this approach alone
 does not fully reduce managerial risk aversion.32 A second approach is to reduce
 the focus on entrepreneurial risk taking by restructuring the business portfolio to a
 set of mature stable businesses where innovation is less necessary and use of
 financial controls is appropriate. This scenario, of course, does not resolve the
 strategic competitiveness problem. Finally downscoping by creating a narrower
 span of control and reasserting strategic control has been used by many highly
 diversified firms.
 Downscoping
 Selling off non-essential divisions unrelated to firms' major businesses allows
 managers to regain strategic control by emphasizing firm strengths and resources.
 Navistar management adeptly described this strategy: "We will grow in markets
 where we can create enough advantage to earn a good return for our
 shareowners. We will redeploy resources from markets where we cannot.33
 Downscoping also reduces the amount of information processing required by the
 CEOs enabling them to regain strategic control.
 Although restructuring
 is a useful step toward
 regaining strategic
 control. managers
 must ensure
 entrepreneurial
 renewal as well.
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 During the process of downscoping, companies may also be able to reduce
 leverage, which should free cash flows for use in R&D activities and human
 resource development programs. For example, one study found that firms
 generally increased R&D investment after downscoping. 4The decrease in
 financial risk associated with debt reduction also may increase managers'
 willingness to accept the risks associated with innovative activities.
 Downsizing, however, may signal market retreat, possibly due to foreign
 competition. We believe that the emphasis in restructuring should be on
 downscoping, rather than downsizing. Recent examples of downscoping include
 Marriott's divestment of restaurants, American Brands' exit from foods, General
 Mills' withdrawal from retailing, and Allegis' sale of hotel and car rental
 businesses.
 Richard Miller's actions at Wang, after he was hired as CEO in 1989, is an
 excellent example of effective restructuring. He, along with a special team of
 managers, identified assets that could be sold to raise about $600 million in cash.
 In so doing, $500 million in loans were paid off. However, in choosing assets for
 divestiture, he protected assets that could be developed and help the firm in the
 long term. For example, some managers recommended selling a small subsidiary
 that provides voice mail services to other larger firms. Miller rejected that idea
 because he felt that the firm would fit into Wang's long-term strategy of offering
 customers information in all forms-text data, image, or voice.35
 Development of Human Capital
 When restructuring special emphasis should be placed on human resources.
 Employees may become concerned how restructuring affects their job and future.
 This concern is real since restructuring often includes a reduction in the number of
 middle managers. Firms must retain their best talent. This involves evaluating
 employee ability while reassuring top employees of their security and future
 opportunity with the firm. Decreasing the number of managers causes greater
 decentralization of authority and responsibility. Thus, employees must become
 technologically proficient and able to operate autonomously. Consequently,
 restructuring also creates a strong need for developing the firm's remaining
 employees.
 Japanese firms have long experienced success in developing employees, in the
 United States and Japan. Contrary to what some experts anticipated, the Japanese
 have reproduced quality manufacturing ventures in this country. The
 extraordinary success of the Toyota-GM joint venture, New United Motor
 Manufacturing, Inc., is an example. This venture produced as many cars with
 approximately half the workers as did the previous GM plant in the same location.
 Toyota's introduction of "human capital" methods among a union (UAW) work
 force known for its poor work habits, directly challenges the idea that Japanese
 methods are culture bound. Johnson suggested that "advanced capitalism"
 emphasizes tenured employment, job rotation, on-the-job education, shallow
 hierarchies of authority, and worker internalization of the enterprise.36
 These are not the standard participative management techniques used by
 American businesses, which assume that the happy worker is the productive
 worker. Paul Gray, president of MIT, argued that U.S. firms must view employees
 as a resource to be maximized rather than a cost to be minimized. Miller, Wang's
 CEO, believes that to develop star employees, the leader must provide the vision
 and, with this vision, bright people along with good ideals will surface. For
 example, shortly after he became CEO, Miller delegated responsibility to a middle
 manager to analyze Wang's global computer pricing strategy. In three short
 weeks, this manager had completed his assignment. He analyzed global
 competitors and their pricing structures on six continents. Furthermore, he
 During the process of
 downscoping,
 companies may also
 be able to reduce
 leverage, which
 should free cash flows
 for use in R&D
 activities and human
 resource development
 programs.
 Miller, Wang's CEO,
 believes that to
 develop star
 employees, the leader
 must provide the
 vision and, with this
 vision, bright people
 along with good ideas
 will surface.
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 identified problems and developed recommendations to solve them. For instance,
 he discovered service problems and recommended that a fax machine be installed
 in the CEO's office so that customers could immediately notify the CEO of service
 problems. Miller said the manager acted quickly and developed creative
 solutions. Miller stated, "In my book that's leadership."37
 Renewed Commitment to Innovation
 Revitalized R&D efforts along with a clarification of the focus of research activities
 should be a part of the restructuring effort. While applied research is very
 important if a firm is to develop products with commercial value, it often must be
 preceded by basic research. In the last decade, little basic research has occurred
 in U.S. industry outside of that commissioned by the military. Because applied
 research with a base provided by basic research has a greater chance for
 success, basic and applied research should be balanced.
 A proper balance between product and process research and development must
 also be reached. U.S. firms tend to emphasize product research while Japanese
 firms emphasize process research. Japanese firms have developed new ways of
 producing higher quality products while developing highly effective
 manufacturing processes. Their innovations have been systematic and
 incremental and have helped them produce higher quality products and thereby
 gain a competitive advantage in a number of industries.
 U.S. firms that invest in product and process R&D soon realize the benefits.
 Several directors and top managers recommended to McKernan, CEO of Clark
 Equipment, to get out of the forklift market. Instead, McKernan spent $100 million
 to redesign the product and its manufacturing process. In that year the firm lost
 $60 million. However, afterwards sales began to escalate, Clark's stock value
 tripled, and earnings grew by 50 percent in 1989. In 1987, Quantum, a disk-drive
 manufacturer, was nearly driven out of the market by innovative competitors. As
 a result, the firm decided to drop its 51/4-inch disk drive business and invest in the
 3?/2-inch disk drive. It had to develop and learn a completely new technology and,
 therefore, formed a joint venture with a subsidiary of Matsushita which helped
 Quantum revamp its manufacturing processes. Quantum engineers learned to
 redesign new products twenty times instead of two. In so doing, many
 manufacturing problems were prevented. Since that time, sales and profits have
 increased almost 400 percent.38
 Balance between basic, applied, process, and product research requires
 cooperation between multiple departments within the firm. Cooperation in the
 innovation process is facilitated by development of an effective organizational
 culture.
 Cultivation of an Effective Corporate Culture
 When AT&T restructured, as required by federal mandate, it also dramatically
 changed its culture. Because restructuring represents such a drastic organizational
 change, it is an appropriate time to change or develop a corporate culture that
 facilitates strategic competitiveness. Restructuring, which is usually induced by
 external pressure, creates an opportunity for top managers to blend strategic
 management with internal organizational change.
 ...........................-..-..-.--.-..-.-.......-............... . ........................................--.-..-....-...............-..- - -- - ...- . ..............- .- - --...............................................- -
 Although the field of organizational change traditionally has focused on human,
 individual, or group change through processes such as team building,
 restructuring affords the opportunity for system-wide strategic change.39
 Managers who have been successful in transforming a culture estimate that the
 process can take from six to fifteen years.40 On the other hand, cultural
 transformations such as the rapid turnaround of Chrysler Corporation and
 General Electric a few years ago provide evidence that external organizational
 shocks can help speed up the process.
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 United Airlines has a successful corporate culture. In particular, it focuses on
 building a team culture among flight crews. In so doing, the team may prevent or
 correct mistakes that might be made by individual crew members. The 1982 Air
 Florida airplane crash in Washington D.C. and the 1978 Eastern Airlines crash
 outside of Portland were attributed to errors by individual crew members whereby
 the advice of other crew members was ignored. However, in the crash of United
 Flight 232 in Sioux City, 185 of the 296 people aboard survived. The remarkable
 survival rate was attributed to the incredible teamwork exhibited by the crew.41
 The opportunity offered by restructuring should be used to build a more effective
 culture. Cultivation of an effective corporate culture includes developing an
 entrepreneurial spirit, fostering a long-term and global focus, and reemphasizing
 product quality.
 Developing an Entrepreneurial Spiral. Much of the encouragement (or
 discouragement) to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities in large firms is based on
 the firm's culture. The pursuit of opportunity must be rewarded and the penalty for
 failure minimized. Implementing a policy that a proposed project cannot be
 blocked without approval by several levels of managers is an excellent example of
 this quite the reverse of the normal procedure, where a project cannot begin
 without the approval of multiple layers of management. Internal corporate
 venturing departments can be established to develop new commercial products.
 New product champions should be identified, supported, and rewarded. Probably
 the best example of a firm known to have an entrepreneurial culture is 3M where
 many employees are given a certain percent (e.g., 20 percent) of their time to
 work on new ideas. The popular Post-it Note product was developed in this
 innovative environment.
 Kerr and Slocum recommended managing corporate culture with reward systems.
 They maintain that culture represents a means of controlling employee behavior
 and attitude and rewards are a way to achieve control.43 The reward system is a
 visible sign of the firm's values and beliefs and may include salaries, bonuses,
 promotions, or stock. If individual achievement and innovation are required,
 rewards must be based on performance. Expenditures to promote innovation
 might not be calculated against a managers' bonus (with some limit, of course).
 This approach could be in addition to or in place of "extra" rewards for successful
 innovations.
 An entrepreneurial culture must promote diversity and individuality instead of
 conformity. It should promote risk-taking rather than risk-averse behavior and
 therefore it is imperative that rewards be based on long-term rather than
 short-term performance.
 Promotion of a Long-Term and Global Focus.U.S. managers must set their sights
 on a global market. A recent report suggested that exports were helping many
 U.S. firms maintain profitability in the face of domestic economic problems.
 Furthermore, the report suggested that many U.S. firms must think globally to
 survive locally.43
 There is a global market for most basic products and, to expand, many U.S.
 firms must compete in international markets as well as at home. For example,
 the Pacific Rim provides major market opportunities for the United States. Asia
 is one of the hottest markets in the world for automobiles, telecommunications
 equipment, and airline seats. By the end of the 1990s the combined economies of
 countries in the Pacific Rim will be larger than the European common market
 and about equal to those of North America. U.S. business investments in Asia
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 have already paid major returns-31.2 percent in Singapore, 28.8 percent in
 Malaysia, 17.9 percent in South Korea, 23.6 percent in Hong Kong, 22.2 percent
 in Taiwan and 14.1 percent in Japan. This compares well to U.S. firms'
 cumulative foreign investment with an average 15.2 percent return.44
 Strategies must be developed in a framework designed to maximize performance
 in global markets. Providing rewards for international experience and education
 along with participation in international joint ventures are just a few ways to
 accomplish this goal. For example, one advantage of international joint ventures
 is that they allow U.S. managers to learn and develop skills that have provided
 foreign (e.g., Japanese) managers a competitive advantage.
 U.S. managers must also focus on long-term strategies and break the cycle of
 short-term actions. This is not a simple task because it may require some systemic
 changes. First, executive incentive compensation should be based on long-term
 performance. Caution must be used, however. A focus on long-term incentives
 may only offset financial control problems. As shown in a recent study, the result
 may be no relationship (as opposed to a negative one) between long-term
 financial incentives and investment in R&D.45 Thus, incentives should be based on
 the long-term performance of both the division and the firm and, to the extent
 possible, strategic actions (instead of financial outcomes). This requires careful
 analysis. Controls may have to be delegated to group managers (strategic
 business units) where strategic controls can be more effectively applied.
 Focus on High Quality Products and Service. U.S. firms need to produce and
 market products comparable to the competition. High product quality must be
 emphasized. Increasing process R&D investment, while emphasizing the
 importance of quality can be helpful. Investments in human resource development
 can also help employees be more productive (efficient) and produce higher quality
 products.
 To improve quality, U.S. firms must also be willing to invest capital in new plant
 and equipment and develop new manufacturing technologies. For example, the
 use of new process technologies (e.g., robotics) may replace routine and lower
 skilled jobs. Additionally, U.S. firms may form joint ventures with European and
 Japanese firms to learn how to produce higher quality products. However,
 as indicated earlier, this needs to be done while nurturing the workers; a pure
 investment strategy has proven unsuccessful.
 Higher quality also often results from effective integration of functions in firms. For
 example, initial efforts in new products design that use input from down line
 functions in product production and distribution (e.g., manufacturing, testing,
 marketing, service) result in lower product costs and higher product quality. For a
 number of reasons, interfunctional integration is difficult to achieve; however,
 firms can improve product quality and resolve a number of other problems by
 achieving such integration. An effective corporate culture can promote
 interfunctional integration.46
 A Competitiveness Improvement Agenda
 It is clear that U.S. firms have been losing the competitiveness battle to
 international competition. This loss of competitiveness is partially accounted for by
 economic structure and historical and cultural differences. However, these
 differences may have been exaggerated and their effects lessened over time.
 Therefore, as Exhibit 1 suggests, much of the current problem directly relates to
 factors under managers' control. Managers, distracted with merger and
 acquisition activities, have been neglecting important areas such as R&D and
 employee development. Compounding the problem, increases in leverage, size,
 and diversification have led to managerial risk avoidance and the increasing use
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 of financial controls, each of which has produced a reduction of innovative
 activities. Ineffective organizational cultures have reinforced these problems and
 produced organizational inertia.
 Our primary message, however, is not pessimistic. We believe that U.S. managers
 can create more competitive firms and control their own fate. Competitive trends
 can be reversed through decisive strategic actions. Following are summaries of
 our recommendations for improving competitiveness:
 * Restructure the firm to rebuild its competitive strength
 - Downscope (reduce diversification)
 - Divest problem businesses, make careful acquisitions (in growth markets) but
 use acquisitions strategy judiciously
 - Develop human capital (select and retain top talent; emphasize training and
 development; manage to maximize human resources)
 - Renew commitment to innovation (invest in product and process R&D; identify,
 nurture and reward product champions)
 * Cultivate an effective corporate culture
 - Develop an entrepreneurial spirit (reward creative ideas; develop venture
 departments; allow free time to work on entrepreneurial efforts; build
 teamwork)
 - Promote long-term and global focus (emphasize long-term performance in
 executive incentive compensation; search for global market opportunities; seek
 international joint ventures)
 - Provide high quality products and services (invest in new plant and
 equipment to improve processes; invest in human capital; reward quality;
 promote interfunctional integration)
 While this agenda is not a short-term solution, recent restructuring efforts by many
 U.S. firms signal that managers are aware not only of the symptoms, but also of a
 partial cure. There is much opportunity in the global marketplace and U.S. firms
 can seize it with effective executive action.
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